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Abstract
We consider a slightly modified version of the Rock-Scissors-Paper
(RSP) game from the point of view of evolutionary stability. In its classical
version the game has a mixed Nash equilibrium (NE) not stable against
mutants. We find a quantized version of the RSP game for which the
classical mixed NE becomes stable.
1 Introduction
Long played as a children’s pastime, or as an odd-man-out selection process,
the Rock-Scissors-Paper (RSP) is a game for two players typically played using
the players’ hands. The two players opposite each others, tap their fist in their
open palm three times (saying Rock, Scissors, Paper) and then show one of
three possible gestures. The Rock wins against the scissors (crushes it) but
looses against the paper (is wrapped into it). The Scissors wins against the
paper (cuts it) but looses against the rock (is crushed by it). The Paper wins
against the rock (wraps it) but looses against the scissors (is cut by it).
In a slightly modified version of the RSP game both players get a small
premium ǫ for a draw. This game can be represented by the following payoff
matrix


R S P
R −ǫ 1 −1
S −1 −ǫ 1
P 1 −1 −ǫ

 (1)
where −1 < ǫ < 0. The matrix of the usual game is obtained when ǫ is zero in
the matrix (1).
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One cannot win if one’s opponent knew which strategy was going to be
picked. For example, picking Rock consistently all the opponent needs to do
is pick Paper and s/he would win. Players find soon that in case predicting
opponent’s strategy is not possible the best strategy is to pick Rock, Scissors,
or Paper at random. In other words, the player selects Rock, Scissors, or Paper
with a probability of 1
3
. In case opponent’s strategy is predictable picking a
strategy at random with a probability of 1
3
is not the best thing to do unless
the opponent is doing the same [2].
We explore Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs) in quantized RSP game.
Originally defined by Smith and Price [6] as a behavioral phenotype an ESS can-
not be invaded by a mutant strategy when a population is playing it. A mutant
strategy does things in different ways than most of a population does. Smith
and Price considered a symmetric game where the players are anonymous. Let
P [u, v] be the payoff to a player playing u against the player playing v. Strategy
u is an ESS if for any alternative strategy v, the following two requirements are
satisfied
P [u, u] ≥ P [v, u] (2)
and in the case P [u, u] = P [v, u]
P [u, v] > P [v, v] (3)
Requirement (2) is in fact the Nash requirement and says that no single indi-
vidual can gain by unilaterally changing her strategy from u to v. An ESS is in
fact a stable NE in a symmetric game and its stability is against a small group
of mutants [6, 7].
A straight analysis of the modified RSP game of matrix (1) shows that play-
ing each of the three different pure strategies with a fixed equilibrial probability
1
3
constitutes a mixed NE. However it is not an ESS because ǫ is negative [7].
In an earlier paper [3] we showed that in quantized version of certain asym-
metric games between two players it is possible to make appear or disappear an
ESS that is a pure strategy pair NE by controlling the initial state used to play
the game. Because a classical game is embedded in its quantized form, there-
fore, it is possible that a pure strategy pair NE remains intact in both classical
and certain quantized form of the same game but is an ESS in only one form.
Later we presented an example [4] of a symmetric game between two players
for which a pure strategy NE is an ESS in classical version of the game but not
so in a quantized form even when it remains a NE in both versions. This is
more relevant because the idea of an ESS was originally defined for symmetric
contests. We also showed [5] that mixed strategy ESSs can be related to entan-
glement and can be affected by quantization for three player games. However
it is not the case for two player games when the quantum state is in a simpler
form proposed by Marinatto and Weber (M&W) [1] in their scheme to quantize
a two player game in normal form.
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M&W [1] expanded on the scheme proposed by Eisert et al [15] for the game
of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Eisert et al showed that dilemma doesn’t exist in a
quantum version of the game. Their motivation of M&W was to remove the
need of an unentangling gate in Eisert’s scheme [8, 9]. In our effort to extend
the ideas of evolutionary game theory toward quantum games we found M&W’s
scheme more suitable for following reasons:
(a). In usual setup of a symmetric bi-matrix evolutionary game two pure
strategies are assumed such that players can play a mixed strategy by their
probabilistic combination. In a similar way players in M&W’s scheme can play
a mixed strategy by applying two unitary operators in their possession with
classical probabilities.
(b): The usual definition of ‘fitness’ of a mixed strategy in evolutionary
games [2] can be given a straightforward extension in M&W’s scheme [3]. It is
done when in the quantum game players use only one unitary operator out of
the two.
(c): The theory of ESSs in evolutionary game theory is developed mostly for
situations when players are anonymous and possess a discrete number of pure
strategies. We find that ESS idea can be extended towards quantum settings
more easily in M&W’s scheme than in Eisert’s scheme involving a continuum
of pure strategies players have option to play. The idea of an ESS as a sta-
ble equilibrium is confronted with problems when players have an access to a
continuum of pure strategies [10].
In this paper we want to extend our previous results regarding effects of
quantization on evolutionary stability for a modified version of the RSP game.
This game is different because now classically each player possesses three pure
strategies instead of two. A classical mixed NE exists that is not an ESS. Our
motivation is to explore the possibility that the classical mixed NE becomes an
ESS for some initial entangled quantum state. We show that such a quantum
state not only exists but also easy to find.
2 Quantized RSP game
Using simpler notation: R ∼ 1, S ∼ 2, P ∼ 3 we quantize this game via M&W’s
scheme [1]. We allow the two players are in possession of three unitary operators
I, C and D defined as
I |1〉 = |1〉 C |1〉 = |3〉 D |1〉 = |2〉
I |2〉 = |2〉 C |2〉 = |2〉 D |2〉 = |1〉
I |3〉 = |3〉 C |3〉 = |1〉 D |3〉 = |3〉
where C† = C = C−1 and D† = D = D−1 and I is identity operator.
We also start from a general payoff matrix for two players each having three
strategies
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

1 2 3
1 (α11, β11) (α12, β12) (α13, β13)
2 (α21, β21) (α22, β22) (α23, β23)
3 (α31, β31) (α32, β32) (α33, β33)

 (4)
where αij , βij are payoffs to Alice and Bob respectively when Alice plays i and
Bob plays j and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3. Suppose Alice and Bob apply operators C D and
I with probabilities p, p1and (1− p− p1) and q, q1and (1− q− q1) respectively.
Let represent the initial state of the game by ρin. After Alice plays her strategy
the state changes to
A
ρin = (1− p− p1)IAρinI
†
A + pCAρinC
†
A + p1DAρinD
†
A (5)
The final density matrix after Bob too has played his strategy is
A,B
ρf = (1− q − q1)IB
A
ρinI
†
B + qCB
A
ρinC
†
B + q1DB
A
ρinD
†
B (6)
This density matrix can be written as
A,B
ρf = (1− p− p1)(1− q − q1)
{
IA ⊗ IBρinI
†
A ⊗ I
†
B
}
+ p(1− q − q1)×{
CA ⊗ IBρinC
†
A ⊗ I
†
B
}
+ p1(1− q − q1)
{
DA ⊗ IBρinD
†
A ⊗ I
†
B
}
+
(1− p− p1)q
{
IA ⊗ CBρinI
†
A ⊗ C
†
B
}
+ pq
{
CA ⊗ CBρinC
†
A ⊗ C
†
B
}
+
p1q
{
DA ⊗ CBρinD
†
A ⊗ C
†
B
}
+ (1− p− p1)q1
{
IA ⊗DBρinI
†
A ⊗D
†
B
}
+pq1
{
CA ⊗DBρinC
†
A ⊗D
†
B
}
+ p1q1
{
DA ⊗DBρinD
†
A ⊗D
†
B
}
(7)
The basis vectors of initial quantum state with three pure classical strategies are
|11〉 , |12〉 , |13〉 , |21〉 , |22〉 , |23〉 , |31〉 , |32〉 , and |33〉. Setting the initial quantum
state to following general form
|ψin〉 = c11 |11〉+ c12 |12〉+ c13 |13〉+ c21 |21〉+ c22 |22〉+ c23 |23〉+
c31 |31〉+ c32 |32〉+ c33 |33〉 (8)
with normalization
|c11|
2
+ |c12|
2
+ |c13|
2
+ |c21|
2
+ |c22|
2
+ |c23|
2
+
|c31|
2
+ |c32|
2
+ |c33|
2
= 1 (9)
and writing payoff operators for Alice and Bob as [1]
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(PA,B)oper = (α, β)11 |11〉 〈11|+ (α, β)12 |12〉 〈12|+ (α, β)13 |13〉 〈13|+
(α, β)21 |21〉 〈21|+ (α, β)22 |22〉 〈22|+ (α, β)23 |23〉 〈23|+
(α, β)31 |31〉 〈31|+ (α, β)32 |32〉 〈32|+ (α, β)33 |33〉 〈33| (10)
the payoffs to Alice or Bob can be obtained by taking a trace of (PA,B)oper
A,B
ρf
i.e. [1]
PA,B = tr[{(PA,B)oper}
A,B
ρf ] (11)
Payoff to Alice, for example, can be written as
PA = ΦΩΥ
T (12)
where T is for transpose and the matrices Φ, Ω, and Υ are
Φ = [ (1 − p− p1)(1 − q − q1) p(1− q − q1) p1(1− q − q1)
(1 − p− p1)q pq p1q (1− p− p1)q1 pq1 p1q1 ]
Υ = [ α11 α12 α13 α21 α22 α23 α31 α32 α33 ]
Ω =


|c11|
2 |c12|
2 |c13|
2 |c21|
2 |c22|
2 |c23|
2 |c31|
2 |c32|
2 |c33|
2
|c31|
2 |c32|
2 |c33|
2 |c21|
2 |c22|
2 |c23|
2 |c11|
2 |c12|
2 |c13|
2
|c21|
2
|c22|
2
|c23|
2
|c11|
2
|c12|
2
|c13|
2
|c31|
2
|c32|
2
|c33|
2
|c13|
2
|c12|
2
|c11|
2
|c23|
2
|c22|
2
|c21|
2
|c33|
2
|c32|
2
|c31|
2
|c33|
2
|c32|
2
|c31|
2
|c23|
2
|c22|
2
|c21|
2
|c13|
2
|c12|
2
|c11|
2
|c23|
2
|c22|
2
|c21|
2
|c13|
2
|c12|
2
|c11|
2
|c33|
2
|c32|
2
|c31|
2
|c12|
2
|c11|
2
|c13|
2
|c22|
2
|c21|
2
|c23|
2
|c32|
2
|c31|
2
|c33|
2
|c32|
2
|c31|
2
|c33|
2
|c22|
2
|c21|
2
|c23|
2
|c12|
2
|c11|
2
|c13|
2
|c22|
2
|c21|
2
|c23|
2
|c12|
2
|c11|
2
|c13|
2
|c32|
2
|c31|
2
|c33|
2


(13)
This payoff is for the general matrix given in eq. (4). In case an exchange of
strategies by Alice and Bob also exchanges their respective payoffs the game
is said to be symmetric. The idea of evolutionary stability in mathematical
biology is generally considered in symmetric contests. In a symmetric contest
payoff to a player is then defined by his strategy and not by his identity. Payoffs
in classical mixed strategy game can be obtained from eq. (11) when initial
state is |ψin〉 = |11〉 and the game is symmetric when αij = βji in the matrix
(4). Similarly the quantum game played using the general quantum state of
eq. (8) becomes symmetric when |cij |
2
= |cji|
2
for all constants cij in the initial
quantum state of eq. (8). This condition should hold along with the requirement
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αij = βji on the matrix (4). The payoff to Alice or Bob i.e. PA, PB then does
not need a subscript and we can use only P .
We now come to the question of evolutionary stability in this quantized
version of the RSP game.
3 Evolutionary stability in the quantized RSP
game
We define a strategy by a pair of numbers (p, p1) when players are playing quan-
tized RSP game. It is understood that the identity operator is ,then, applied
with probability 1 − p− p1. Similar to requirements in eq. (2) and eq. (3) the
conditions making a strategy (p⋆, p⋆1) an ESS can now be written as [6, 7]
1. P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p
⋆, p⋆1)} > P{(p, p1), (p
⋆, p⋆1)}
2. if P{(p⋆, p⋆
1
), (p⋆, p⋆
1
)} = P{(p, p1), (p
⋆, p⋆
1
)} then
P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p, p1)} > P{(p, p1), (p, p1)} (14)
Suppose (p⋆, p⋆1) is a mixed NE then
{
∂P
∂p
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
(p⋆ − p) +
∂P
∂p1
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
(p⋆1 − p1)
}
≥ 0 (15)
Using substitutions
|c11|
2
− |c31|
2
= △1, |c21|
2
− |c11|
2
= △´1
|c13|
2
− |c33|
2
= △2, |c22|
2
− |c12|
2
= △´2
|c12|
2
− |c32|
2
= △3, |c23|
2
− |c13|
2
= △´
3
(16)
we get
∂P
∂p
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
= p⋆(△1 −△2) {(α11 + α33)− (α13 + α31)}+
p⋆1(△1 −△3) {(α11 + α32)− (α12 + α31)} −
△1(α11 − α31)−△2(α13 − α33)−△3(α12 − α32) (17)
∂P
∂p1
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
= p⋆(△´
3
−△´
1
) {(α11 + α23)− (α13 + α21)}+
p⋆1(△
´
2 −△
´
1) {(α11 + α22)− (α12 + α21)}+
△´
1
(α11 − α21) +△
´
2
(α12 − α22) +△
´
3
(α13 − α23) (18)
For the matrix (1) above equations can be written as
6
∂P
∂p
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
= △1 {−2ǫp
⋆ − (3 + ǫ)p⋆1 + (1 + ǫ)}+
△2 {2ǫp
⋆ + (1 − ǫ)} +△3 {(3 + ǫ)p
⋆
1 − 2} (19)
∂P
∂p1
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
= △´
1
{−p⋆(3 − ǫ) + 2ǫp⋆
1
+ (1− ǫ)} −
△´2 {2ǫp
⋆
1 − (1 + ǫ)} +△
´
3 {(3− ǫ)p
⋆ − 2} (20)
Also the payoff difference in the second condition of an ESS and given in eq.
(14) reduces to
P{(p⋆, p⋆
1
), (p, p1)} − P{(p, p1), (p, p1)}
= (p⋆ − p)[−△1 {2ǫp+ (3 + ǫ)p1 − (1 + ǫ)}+
△2{2ǫp+ (1− ǫ)}+△3{(3 + ǫ)p1 − 2}] +
(p⋆
1
− p1)[−△
´
1
{(3− ǫ)p− 2ǫp1 − (1− ǫ)} −
△´2{2ǫp1 − (1 + ǫ)}+△
´
3{(3− ǫ)p− 2}] (21)
With the substitutions p⋆ − p = x and p⋆1 − p1 = y above payoff difference is
P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p, p1)} − P{(p, p1), (p, p1)}
= △1x {2ǫx+ (3 + ǫ)y} −△2(2ǫx
2)−△3xy(3 + ǫ)−
△´1y {2ǫy − (3− ǫ)x}+△
´
2(2ǫy
2)−△´3xy(3− ǫ) (22)
provided
∂P
∂p
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
= 0
∂P
∂p1
| p=q=p⋆
p1=q1=p
⋆
1
= 0 (23)
The conditions in eq. (23) together define the mixed NE (p⋆, p⋆1). Consider now
the modified RSP game in classical form obtained by setting |c11|
2
= 1 and all
the rest of the constants to zero. The eqs. (23) now become
− 2ǫp⋆ − (ǫ+ 3)p⋆1 + (ǫ+ 1) = 0
(−ǫ+ 3)p⋆ − 2ǫp⋆
1
+ (ǫ− 1) = 0 (24)
and p⋆ = p⋆
1
= 1
3
is obtained as a mixed NE for all the range −1 < ǫ < 0. From
eq. (22) we get
P{(p⋆, p⋆1), (p, p1)} − P{(p, p1), (p, p1)}
= 2ǫ(x2 + y2 + xy) = ǫ
{
(x+ y)2 + (x2 + y2)
}
≤ 0 (25)
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In the classical form of the RSP game, therefore, the mixed NE p⋆ = p⋆
1
= 1
3
is a NE but not an ESS because the second condition of ESS given in eq. (14)
does not hold.
Define now a new initial state as follows
|ψin〉 =
1
2
{|12〉+ |21〉+ |13〉+ |31〉} (26)
and use it to play the game instead of the classical game obtained from |ψin〉 =
|11〉. The strategy p⋆ = p⋆1 =
1
3
still forms a mixed NE because the conditions
given by eq. (23) hold true for it. However the payoff difference of eq. (22) is
now given below when −1 < ǫ < 0, and x, y 6= 0
P{(p⋆, p⋆
1
), (p, p1)} − P{(p, p1), (p, p1)}
= −ǫ
{
(x+ y)2 + (x2 + y2)
}
> 0 (27)
Therefore, the mixed Nash equilibrium p⋆ = p⋆
1
= 1
3
not existing as an ESS in
the classical form of the RSP game becomes an ESS when the game is quantized
and played using the initial entangled quantum state given by the eq. (26).
Note that from eq. (11) the payoff sum to Alice and Bob PA + PB can be
obtained for both classical mixed strategy game (i.e. |ψin〉 = |12〉) and the
quantum game played using the quantum state of eq. (26). For the matrix (1)
we write these sums as (PA+PB)cl and (PA+PB)qu for classical mixed strategy
and quantum games respectively and find
(PA + PB)cl = −2ǫ{(1− p− p1)(1− q − q1) + p1q1 + pq} (28)
and
(PA + PB)qu = −
{
1
2
(PA + PB)cl + ǫ
}
(29)
In case ǫ = 0 both the classical and quantum games are clearly zero sum. For
our slightly modified version of the RSP game we have −1 < ǫ < 0 and both
versions of the game become non zero sum.
4 Discussion
Game theoretical modelling of interactions between living organisms in natural
word has been developed mostly during the last three decades. Use of matrix
games is quite common in areas such as theoretical and mathematical biology.
The RSP game that we investigate in present paper is also played in nature
like many other games. Lizards in the Coast Range of California play this
8
game using three alternative male strategies locked in an ecological never ending
process from which there seems little escape. On the other hand the recently
developed quantum game theory has been shown to find applications in quantum
information [17]. Though there is no evidence yet the possibility of quantum
games being played at molecular level was hinted by Dawkins [18]. Trying to find
the relevance of ideas from population biology in quantum settings is something
that we call an inspiration from Dawkins’ ideas.
The possibility of quantum mechanics playing a more direct role in life than
binding together atoms has attracted much attention [12, 11]. Quantum me-
chanics ‘fast tracking’ a chemical soup to states that are biological and complex
is an idea about which physicists from many areas have expressed opinions and
the debate still continues. Supersymmetry in particle physics giving a unified
description of fermions and bosons have also been suggested to provide an ex-
planation of coding assignments in genetic code [13]. Patel’s idea of quantum
dynamics having a role in the DNA replication is another interesting suggestion
[14]. Quantum game theory [15, 16] can also have possibly interesting contri-
butions to make towards attempts to understand quantum mechanical role in
life.
Mathematical biologists have successfully developed mathematical models
of evolution, especially, after attention was diverted to game theoretical models
of evolution [7] and the idea of an ESS became central in evolutionary game
theory. The central idea of evolution i.e. survival of the fittest is now be
formulated as a mathematical algorithm usually known as replicator dynamic.
We suggest recent progress in quantum game theory allows evolutionary ideas
to enter and have a role in situations generally believed to lie in the domain
of quantum mechanics. This combination of evolutionary ideas in quantum
settings is interesting from several perspectives. Quantum considerations in the
evolution of genetic code and genetic algorithms in which replicators receive
their payoffs via quantum strategies are two questions [5] where evolutionary
ideas can be incorporated in quantum game like situations. Another possible
relevance is the competing chemical reactions in life molecules treated as players
in a game. A winning chemical reaction corresponding to life hints a role of
quantum mechanics because quantum strategies have been recently shown to
be more effective their classical counterparts [1, 15].
Population approach borrowed from evolutionary game theory with its cen-
tral idea of an ESS combined with recent developments in quantum game theory
provides a new approach to certain questions relating to role of quantum me-
chanics in life. The analysis of the RSP game from evolutionary point of view
is an example where ‘stability’ comes to a classical NE when players revert to
quantum strategies. The ‘stability’ is with respect to an invasion by mutants
appearing in small numbers. This stability of NE coming out of quantization
can have a relevance in all the three situations indicated above.
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5 Conclusion
We explored evolutionary stability in a modified Rock-Scissors-Paper quantum
game. We showed that a mixed strategy NE not an ESS in classical version of
the game can be made an ESS when the two player play instead a quantum
game by using a selected form of initial entangled state on which they apply
unitary operators in their possession. Quantum mechanics, thus, gives stability
to a classical mixed NE against invasion by mutants. Stability against mutants
for a mixed classical NE can be made to disappear in certain types of three
player symmetric games when players decide to resort to quantum strategies [5].
Stability against mutants in pair-wise contests coming as a result of quantum
strategies have been shown a possibility for only pure strategies in certain type
of symmetric games [3]. Our results imply the selected method of quantization
[1] can bring stability against mutants to a classical mixed NE in pair-wise
symmetric contests when the classically available number of pure strategies to
a player is increased to three from two. A different behavior is also observed of
mixed NE from pure NE in relation to quantization.
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